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Abstract
This paper argues that workers’ unemployment risk may induce firms to adopt conservative
payout policies. I show that firms increase their dividend payout following sharp increases in
unemployment insurance generosity, that reduce workers’ personal losses due to layoffs. Firms
increase payout by about 6% following positive changes in protection for unemployed workers
that are plausibly unrelated to macroeconomic conditions. This effect is driven by firms with
poor growth prospects, high labor intensity, and in more volatile industries, suggesting that
public insurance crowds out private insurance by firms. Thus, labor market considerations
play an important role in shaping firms’ payout decisions.
∗Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University and SAFE, House of Finance, 60323 Frankfurt am Main; phone: +49 (69)
798 33855; email: pezone@safe.uni-frankfurt.de.
1 Introduction
Unemployment risk faced by workers is a crucial determinant of firms’ financial policies, as shown
both in theoretical (Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010)) and empirical (Agrawal
and Matsa (2013)) research. While shareholders can diversify away all the idiosyncratic risk, a
worker’s human capital is fully invested in the firm she is employed with. Since unemployment risk
originated by a firm’s distress would be priced in higher wages, firms may find it optimal to reduce
fluctuations in workers’ wages and lower the risk of distress, as predicted by implicit contract models
along the lines of Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975). To accomplish this, managers will engage in
more conservative financial policies, such as lower leverage (Agrawal and Matsa (2013)) or R&D
expenditures (Ellul, Wang, and Zhang (2015)).
In this paper, I argue that dividend payout policies, as a result of the above logic, may also be
shaped by labor market considerations. The intuition is straightforward. When determining the
aggressiveness of their payout policies, managers face a trade-off. A higher dividend payout may
have benefits such as mitigating agency problems, signaling good earnings prospects, or attracting
particular types of investors, like tax-free institutions. Oppositely, aggressive payout policies may
reduce a firm’s operating flexibility, especially given that dividend policies may be hard to reverse
even in periods of distress.
Workers are likely to be among the most affected stakeholders by payout policies. First, a
lower cash buffer may render a firm more vulnerable to the entry of competitors in the same
market (Fresard (2010)) or to the tightening of financial constraints (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). Consistent with this idea, firms with volatile
earnings are unlikely to pay dividends (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000)) Second,
because managers may be reluctant to cut dividends during downturns to avoid sending negative
signals to investors (Allen and Gale (2002)), workers may be exposed to layoffs to free up resources.
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As a result, workers may negatively perceive cash transfers to shareholders as they may increase
their human capital risk.1
Crucially, firms’ incentives to give job security to workers are shaped by the generosity of the
insurance provided by the public sector. Private insurance will be crowded out by public insurance,
so long as the latter is effective in mitigating human costs of unemployment. If this is the case,
firms may engage in more aggressive payout policies when the public unemployment insurance (UI)
system is more generous. Indeed, an extensive literature, documents that UI provided by the public
sector does indeed have first order effects on unemployed workers’ welfare, for example by reducing
their consumption volatility (as shown in Gruber (1997)).
In the empirical tests that follow, I analyze how dividend payout decisions are affected by large
sharp increases in UI generosity across US states between 1991 and 2007. I identify 61 instances
where a state legislator increased the maximum weekly benefit and document, in a difference-in-
difference framework, that payout increases by about 4 percentage points following each event.
While this preliminary evidence is robust to a number of different empirical specifications, in
most of the paper I focus on a restricted sample of events and firms. I proceed as follows. First, I
identify the underlying cause and political context that was the basis of the policy shift. I obtain
detailed information regarding 18 out of 61 reforms. I then identify 12 instances in which the precise
timing of the reforms was neither likely to be related to changing economic conditions nor associated
with the adoption of other significant policies. Such events are common, given that political factors
unrelated to significant economic events often influence UI policies adopted by states (Blaustein
et al. (1993)). Each firm headquartered in a treated state is matched with a control firm similar in
1 For example, consider the following quote of a union leader from the “Massachusetts Jobs with Justice”: Some
CEOs get bonuses if their company pays stockholder dividends above certain levels. The easiest way to increase
dividends is to pay out profits rather than reinvesting them in the company’s employees. There is no incentive for
corporate CEOs to expand hiring and create new jobs with decent wages; instead, CEOs have a strong incentive to
cut positions and reduce wages and benefits. (Tom Iacobucci, “On Labor Day”, The Valley Advocate (09/01/2011))
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terms of a number of covariates, where both firms operate in the same industry and census region.
This matching procedure provides a stringent test, as it controls for a number potential unobserved
confounding factors, such as demand shocks, which may vary at the regional or industry level. I find
that treated firms increase their payout by roughly 6% relative to matched control firms, although
this effect is relatively short-lived. Results are qualitatively similar when restricting the analysis to
firms that, previous to the increase in UI generosity, were not paying dividends.
Several robustness checks help rule out the possibility of omitted variables or alternative in-
terpretations. First, the change in payout occurs only after a benefit increase is announced; no
difference in trends can be detected before the policy change between treated and control firms.
Second, treated and control firms are headquartered in states that share similar levels of growth
in unemployment and income per capita. This suggests that macroeconomic shocks are unlikely to
be a significant confounding factor. Third, I find similar results when I focus on different measures
of payout, such as total payout (which includes repurchases), dividend per share, and dividend per
asset.
The fact that I obtain similar results when I ignore the potential endogeneity related to the
adoption of some of the policies and the possibility that treated and control firms are not well-
matched is particularly reassuring for two reasons. First, it suggests that dramatically different
results are unlikely when adopting different screening criteria for selecting the policy changes or
using a different matching procedure. Second, the smaller magnitude of the effect of UI changes
on payout obtained when using this less conservative approach underscores that some of these
events, excluded from the main analysis, may be related to the anticipation of economic downturns.
This would bias the coefficient downward, as firms may be less prone to increase dividends when
anticipating periods of poor economic conditions.
The cross-sectional heterogeneity of these results supports this “implicit insurance” channel. I
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expect that firms employing extensively labor, as opposed to capital, in their production process
will react more strongly to the provision of public insurance. Using two proxies for labor intensity
(number of employees divided by either value of assets or value of property, plant, and equipment),
I find that the effect on payout is significant and large only in high labor intensity firms.
Moreover, firms operating in less risky industries should be less affected by UI policies, given that
in such sectors there should be little reason for insulating workers from adverse demand shocks.
Using proxies for earnings and employment volatility at the industry level, I document that the
increase in payout is present only in firms in high volatility industries.
Workers in firms with poor growth prospects are also more likely to be exposed to layoff risk.
Consistent with this hypothesis, I show that the increase in payout is concentrated among firms
with low profitability, profitability growth, or Tobin’s Q, which are three strong predictors of future
employment growth.
Finally, I show that UI generosity affects firms’ payout policies only for firms in industries with
low wage or employment growth. Intuitively, workers’ costs of unemployment will be higher if the
probability of being quickly re-absorbed by the labor market are low. This should be true especially
for workers employed in industries with declining employment. Similarly, workers in industries with
low wage growth will be unlikely to find attractive jobs after a period of unemployment.
Evidence on additional outcomes provides additional support to this implicit contract hypoth-
esis. Investment growth is not significantly related to changes in UI policies, suggesting that the
results are not driven by a decrease in growth opportunities. However, I find some evidence of a
decline in cash holding and an increase in leverage and net leverage, albeit only for firms with neg-
ative earnings2, consistent with the findings of Agrawal and Matsa (2013). Moreover, in line with
the theoretical predictions of Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975), and with corroborating international
2 These firms are excluded in the majority of the analysis because their payout ratio is not well-defined.
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empirical evidence (Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi (2014)), employment growth becomes more re-
sponsive to industry-level growth opportunities, as measured by the firms’ industry median Tobin’s
Q.
Alternatively, plausible arguments which could in principle be consistent with such evidence
find little support. Feldstein (1976) contends that UI policies act as an implicit subsidy to firms
that experience large, seasonal shifts in demand. Possibly, this may induce managers to remunerate
shareholders with higher dividends. Additionally, firms may find it optimal to reduce firm liquidity
in order to counteract workers’ bargaining power (Matsa (2010)). None of these alternative expla-
nations find support in the data. The effect of UI policies on payout is largely independent of firms’
sales seasonality or their state’s degree of unionization.
This paper is related to recent work in Corporate Finance that argues that labor market con-
siderations are important determinants of financial decisions. For example, (Serfling (2016) and
Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015)), particularly those that emphasize the effects of UI provisions on
managers’ choices (Agrawal and Matsa (2013), Ellul et al. (2015), Ellul et al. (2014), Dou, Khan,
and Zou (2016)). Additionally, empirical work has documented that unions’ power may influence
payout decisions (He, Tian, and Yang (2016), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991), Chino (2016)). Even
so, none of those papers have focused explicitly on the implicit contract channel I propose.
By documenting a relation between payout decisions and unemployment costs, I complement this
empirical and theoretical work by analyzing another, important dimension through which the labor
market impacts firms’ actions. Moreover, while most of the literature on dividends payout focuses
primarily on shareholders’ and managers’ objectives, I argue that other stakeholders’ interests, such
as those of workers, are important determinants of payout policies.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section 3 presents
data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main empirical results and Section 5 analyzes
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the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of UI on payout decisions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
An extensive body of empirical work has documented that labor market considerations impact
firms’ financial decisions. Serfling (2016) and Simintzi et al. (2015) document that leverage is
inversely related to labor rigidities due to higher firing costs both in the US and in a cross-section
of countries. Matsa (2010) shows how firms use leverage strategically in order to improve their
bargaining position vis-a-vis unionized workers, whereas Schmalz (2015) studies close unionization
elections and finds that this relationship depends on a firm’s degree of financial constraints.
Most studies at the intersection of labor and dividend payout policies focus on managers’ conflict
with unions. Associated work includes DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991), who show that unionized
firms sharply cut dividend payments in period of distress, and He et al. (2016), who illustrate how
firms adopt conservative payout policies following unionization to preserve operating flexibility.
This paper is also related to empirical work on the effect of UI policies on unemployed workers.
There is strong evidence that UI has the beneficial effect of allowing laid off workers to smooth their
consumption (Gruber (1997), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005), Browning and Crossley (2001)) or
stabilize the business cycle (Di Maggio and Kermani (2015)).
Other papers have focused on the possible moral hazards created by more generous UI policies,
which may induce workers to reduce effort in their job search (Solon (1985), Card and Levine
(2000), Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007)). While there is overall support to the idea that UI may
subsidize longer unemployment spells, there is disagreement about the actual magnitude of this
effect. Chetty (2008) explicitly derives a formula for the optimal UI benefit which accounts for this
trade-off. Supplemental work has focused on the potential improvement in matching resulting from
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the ability of the unemployed workers to search for a better job for longer periods of time, with
ambiguous results (see for example Card et al. (2007)). Overall, this evidence supports the idea
that UI provisions represent meaningful shocks to the labor market environment.
Theoretical and, more recently, empirical work, have found that it may be optimal for firms
to provide partial insurance to workers in order to reduce wage premia related to unemployment
risk. Theoretical papers include Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975), which show that firms may
be willing to avoid fluctuations in wages and, under certain conditions, employment by absorbing
shocks connected with uncertain demand.
Relatedly, Titman (1984) has demonstrated that the optimal capital structure is related to the
costs of distress borne by workers and other stakeholders (such as customers and suppliers). Similar
predictions are obtained in a dynamic moral hazard model by Berk et al. (2010). Empirical work
has found support for these predictions, relying on the observation that the more generous the
public UI system, the lower unemployment costs. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) show that leverage
is positively correlated with unemployment benefits in the US. Similarly, Ellul et al. (2015) show
that a larger fraction of CEOs’ compensation is based on stock or options when UI generosity is
higher, suggesting that shareholders may induce managers to exploit riskier growth opportunities.
Finally, Ellul et al. (2014) find that in countries with lower UI generosity, firms are less likely to lay
off workers following negative industry shocks.
Additional evidence on the effects of UI policies on firms’ decisions includes Dou et al. (2016),
who find that firms are less likely to manage earnings in the presence of more generous UI policies.
This suggests that firms try to improve employee perceptions of employment security when human
costs of unemployment are large. Overall, the empirical evidence presented here complements
this work and suggests an additional important channel through which the labor market affects
managers’ choices.
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My results relate, more broadly, also to papers analyzing factors influencing firms’ payout. A
number of reasons may affect payout policies, such as signaling motives, agency conflict consid-
erations, and management incentives (recent surveys include Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz
(2014) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2008)). Recent empirical work has, however, em-
phasized how such benefits are traded-off against costs in terms of loss of financial flexibility, the
ability to avoid costly financial distress, as well as underinvestment.
Firms favoring dividends payment over repurchases are more likely to hedge risk using financial
instruments, such as derivatives (Bonaim, Hankins, and Harford (2014)). These also tend to have
more volatile cash flows (Jagannathan et al. (2000)). While these papers have typically emphasized
either shareholders’ or managers’ payoffs, I find support for the hypothesis that others stakeholders’
interests, such as those of workers, have a first-order influence on financial decisions, which was a
concept posited theoretically by Titman (1984) and Cornell and Shapiro (1987).
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
Since the adoption of the Social Security Act in 1935, the US has established a joint federal-state
system to provide benefits to unemployed workers. Each state sets the generosity of its UI program,
which is funded through taxes levied on employers. Such taxes are “experience rated,” meaning
that firms more prone to lay off workers suffer higher marginal rates.
Such UI policies in the US represent a relevant setting to test my hypothesis. First, as suggested
by the evidence surveyed in the previous section, they are salient and economically meaningful to
workers. Second, they exhibit substantial variation, both across states and over time.
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I obtain data on UI benefits for each state and year from the Department of Labor website3 for
each state and year. Similarly to Di Maggio and Kermani (2015) and Agrawal and Matsa (2013),
I focus on the maximum benefit (maximum weeks × maximum weekly benefit amount) for each
state. This measure is likely to be the most salient to workers and exhibits the highest variation
across time and state.
Not all changes in UI benefits necessarily correspond to actual legislative acts for two reasons.
First, in some states UI benefit changes are adjusted periodically and are linked to the macroeco-
nomic environment. For example, the maximum weekly benefit changes in every year of my sample
in Colorado. This is because UI benefits are revised annually and are typically mechanically indexed
to the average wage in the manufacturing sector. Second, UI revisions can be pre-announced. For
example, in 1990 the State of California raised the maximum weekly benefit from $166 to $190.
However, it was also announced that subsequent increases would follow in 1991 ($210) and 1992
($230).
In the following, I examine the response of dividend payout following sharp changes in UI
generosity. Therefore, I exclude these instances because, in the first case, they are mechanically
correlated with the macroeconomic outcomes of the state where firms are headquartered. In the
second case, they are fully anticipated by managers. I obtain relevant UI changes from several
editions of the changes in UI legislation bulletins published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
the period of 1991 to 2007. I code all the legislative changes remaining after adopting the previous
two filters. In order to focus only on meaningful changes, I also set a minimum threshold of $100
(in 2010 dollars) in the maximum UI benefit change. This results in 61 changes across 26 states
over the sample period. I complement this dataset with basic macroeconomic variables, measured
at the state-level, from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
3 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp
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The data and is then merged with Compustat annual data, using each firm’s historical head-
quarter. As aforementioned, the time frame covers the years 1991 to 2007. 1991 is the first year
of my sample due to the fact that I use the historical headquarter of firms in my analysis. In the
Compustat database, the headquarter is backfilled, and by not accounting for this, I may end up
coding as treated firms that should belong to the control group, and vice versa (see Heider and
Ljunqvist (2015)). However, I can access historical information on a firm’s headquarter starting
from 1991 onwards from the “Compustat Historical Database.”
The last year of the dataset is 2007 to avoid the years of the Great Recession, which involved a
series of temporary UI extensions (Di Maggio and Kermani (2015)). While most of a firm’s workers
are likely to operate in the state where the firm is headquartered, it is plausible that some of its
workforce will be located in different states, especially in large firms. To attenuate measurement
error, in most of the analysis I exclude firms operating in “dispersed” industries, as identified by
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) (wholesale, trade, retail), that is, firms likely to have a geographically
dispersed workforce.4
I also exclude from the sample financial and utility related firms because accounting variables
are not directly comparable between them and firms in other industries. Moreover, since all the
control variables are expressed as ratios with total assets as denominator, the inclusion of very small
firms in the sample tends to add noise to the estimates. Therefore, following the example of Baker,
Stein, and Wurgler (2003), I exclude the smallest companies in the sample. I do so by computing
the mean asset value over the full sample period and dropping the firms in the bottom decile of the
distribution.
4 In Table 3 I explicitly take into account this problem by using plant level data. See Section 4.1 for details.
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables and the main control variables in the full sample are
in Table 1. As further explained below, it will be convenient to estimate a model in first differences
in order to absorb unobserved heterogeneity across firms. To account for this, I report descriptive
statistics on both levels and first differences of each variable. The main dependent variable is the
change in dividend payout, measured as the common dividend over net income, with all multiplied
by 100 for ease of interpretation. This ratio is meaningful only for positive values of earnings, ergo,
in each year I keep only firms with positive earnings in year t and t+1, as well as non-missing
control variables and dividend payments.
The full sample includes 22,595 firm-year observations and 3,738 unique firms. The 61 UI
increases affect 1,273 firm-years (931 unique firms). These 61 “shocks” are associated with an
average increase in the maximum benefit of $1,008. In terms of the replacement rate, defined as the
maxium benefit divided by the state income per capita, the average increase is 3.37%. These are
meaningful figures compared to the sample means of $14,503 and 40.2%, respectively. The average
dividend payout is 15.58%, and its average growth is 0.32%. More details regarding construction
and sources of the other variables are in the following sections and in Appendix A.1.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
I estimate a model of corporate investment in first differences, similar to Heider and Ljunqvist
(2015)). The advantage of this empirical framework is that it allows control for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Furthermore, it can easily accommodate multiple shocks occurring in the same state over
time. The baseline empirical specification is:
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∆DIVi,t+1 = βUIs,t + δ
′∆Xi,t + θ′∆Zs,t + ϑs + δt + εi,t+1 (1)
where the i, s, j and t subscripts correspond to each firm, state, and year, respectively, and ∆ is
the first-difference operator.
The dependent variable is the change in the dividend payout, defined as common dividends
divided by net income, with all multiplied by 100. UI is a dummy equal to 1 if one of the 61 events
identified according to the procedure described in Section 3.1 occurs in state s and year t. In Section
4.2 and in most of the paper, however, I will restrict the analysis to 12 events plausibly unrelated
to macroeconomic conditions and on a matched sample of firms. ∆Zs,t−1 is a vector of state-level
control variables. Because unemployment benefits are likely to grow in response to an increase
in the number of unemployed workers and will be correlated with workers’ income, I include the
two arguably most relevant controls following Agrawal and Matsa (2013): per capita GDP growth
and unemployment rate growth.5 Beyond that, I also include state-level dummies, which absorb
time-invariant state-level characteristics and year dummies.
∆Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-level controls, also expressed in first differences. It includes Q,
ROA, size, and debt to asset ratios, along with industry dummies (defined using the 2-digit SIC
classification). Q is defined as the total assets plus the market value of the firm (number of shares
outstanding × fiscal year-end price) minus common value of equity, all divided by total assets. This
captures a firm’s investment opportunities. Cash flow is net income over lagged total assets. It can
correlate with dividend payout either because of financial constraints or because it is associated with
investment opportunities not adequately captured by Q. Debt to assets (long-term plus short-term
liabilities, all divided by total assets) is included as an additional control variable and as proxy
5 In unreported tests, I include additional changes in a number of potential determinants for UI policies, such as
the state balance deficit, the state-level percentage of unionized workers, and the political affiliation of the governor.
Results are unaffected by the inclusion of these additional variables.
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for a firm’s financial soundness. Finally, I include size, defined as Log(total assets), because large,
mature firms are on average more likely to issue dividends (Jagannathan et al. (2000)). Following
the recommendations of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), standard errors are clustered
at the state-level in all the regressions.
4 Unemployment Insurance and Dividend Payout Policies
4.1 Preliminary Evidence
Estimates of equation 1 are reported in Table 2, which shows five different specifications, ranging
from the least to the most conservative. In specification 1, I include only the UI dummy and year
and state dummies. The relevant coefficient is significant at the 5% level and equal to 3.60. Column
2 adds state controls (the change in the logarithm of per capita income and unemployment rate),
with the UI coefficient being essentially unaffected. Column 3 includes industry dummies, and
column 4 firm-level controls.
The coefficients on the control variables have the expected sign: larger and more profitable firms
are more likely to issue dividends, while riskier firms (in terms of change in debt to assets), or firms
with stronger future prospects (higher ∆Q) are less likely to do so. Firm controls are endogenous,
so they may bias the estimates, but it is reassuring that both the point estimate and the statistical
significance of the UI coefficient are unaffected.6 To interpret the economic magnitude of this effect,
consider that the standard deviation of the dividend payout ratio in the full sample is 23.57, and the
standard deviation of ∆Div is 41.01. Therefore, a coefficient of 4.214 (last specification) corresponds
to an increase in the dividend payout ratio equal to roughly 10% of a standard deviation of the
6 For brevity, in all the tests that follow I will include all the control variables, but all the results are very similar
if control variables are excluded from the regressions.
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dependent variable.
Panels A, B and C of Figure 1 plot the average maximum benefit, replacement rate, and dividend
payout, respectively, for treated and control firms in the five years surrounding a UI increase. There
is no evidence of differences in trends before year t+1 although the levels of the three variables are
much lower for the eventually treated firms. The gap in UI generosity narrows in year t+1, and
dividend payout for treated firms jumps by about three and a half percentage points, so much that
its mean level is higher than that of control firms. In year t+1, there is a slight reversion and the
two lines intersect each other.
Table 3 presents additional variations over the baseline specification of equation 1 (coefficients
on the control variables are omitted for brevity). Column 1 presents the baseline model. Column
2 includes dispersed industries (resale, wholesale and trade). Here the coefficient drops slightly in
magnitude (2.59), as expected, but remains marginally significant (p-value¡0.10). Column 3 includes
only firms in states that are eventually treated, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), with little
effect on the baseline point estimate.7 Column 4 includes year-industry dummies, and column 5
adds year-industry-census region dummies. The results are robust, with the point estimates of the
UI coefficient being again unchanged relative to the baseline specification of column 1.
In column 6, I replace UI with the fraction of each firm’s workers treated by the UI benefit in-
crease. I obtain data on establishment location and number of employees from Dun and Bradstreet
NETS, and manually match firms in Compustat with the D&B data using their names.8 Unfortu-
nately, such data is likely to be quite noisy.9 Moreover, I was not able to match all the firms and
the sample size drop by approximately 20%. Still, results to this additional test are quite robust. In
7 With only 26 clusters, standard errors are likely to be biased. However, clustering by firm produces very similar
standard errors.
8 More precisely, I use a fuzzy matching algorithm to link company names of the two datasets (using the Stata
command reclink developed by Michael Blasnik) and verify manually the accuracy of each match.
9 The correlation between the total number of employees reported in Compustat and NETS is 46.91%, quite large,
yet still far from one.
14
particular, they suggest that a firm that has 100% of its workers subject to a UI generosity increase
will increase its dividend payout by 4.64%.
4.2 A “Narrative Approach”
Although the results found in the previous section appear robust to different specifications and
choices of control variables, unobserved heterogeneity in underlying economic conditions may cast
doubt on a causal interpretation. If policymakers adjust UI policies in order to respond to varying
macroeconomic conditions or to meet their expectations of future events, the establishment of an
association between corporate decisions and UI policies may be driven simply by underlying changes
in the macroeconomic environment that affect both firms’ and policymakers’ actions.
Fortunately, a number of factors unrelated to the economic environment have been suggested to
affect the variation of UI policies across time and states (Blaustein et al. (1993)). Subsequently, it
is possible, in practice, to identify instances where economic considerations were likely to play little
or no role in shaping the timing of UI benefits revisions.
In this Section I provide more robust evidence by adopting a “narrative approach” in the spirit
of Romer and Romer (2010). I perform a search of news articles through several sources (Factiva,
Lexis Nexis, and search engines), and I collect information regarding the political and economic en-
vironment at the root of these bills together with any concurrent significant reforms simultaneously
implemented.
This kind of strategy, popular in the Labor Economics and Macroeconomics literature, is becom-
ing common also in recent Corporate Finance work. For example, Giroud and Rauh (2015) analyze
changes in tax policies across US states and Simintzi et al. (2015) study major labor reforms in a
sample of developed countries. I am deliberately conservative in my search, and leave legislations
without sufficient information out of my sample. I was able to obtain adequately detailed informa-
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tion for 18 out of 61 cases. Not surprisingly, they involve relative large states, which have more
extensive media coverage. Therefore, they cover about half of the treated firm-years (639 out of
1,273).
I screen the UI increases according to two additional filters. First, I exclude every legislative
change whose timing is clearly related to changing economic conditions. Second, I exclude those
which coincide with confounding reforms, particularly where tax cuts or raises are concerned. It
turns out that this second filter is the most important one of the two, with macro conditions playing
little role in driving the policy changes. These filters leave me with 12 out 18 shocks (and 505 treated
firm-years). The most common reasons for these UI increases are federal funds inflows, upcoming
elections, or isolated economic events, such as layoffs at a single large plant.
Admittedly, this procedure requires some degree of discretion. For this reason, I briefly describe
the political environment surrounding each of the 18 changes in Appendix A.2. A review of these
legislative changes shows that the 12 UI increases I am left with suggest that they provide a
reasonably adequate setting to test for a causal link between unemployment risk and financial
policies.10 None of them is linked to changes in corporate or UI tax rates, or to reforms one would
expect to substantially affect corporate behavior. The underlying causes vary, but they can hardly
be linked to dramatic developments in the corporate or macroeconomic environment and can be
roughly classified in four categories. Three legislative changes were motivated by layoffs or strikes
in plants belonging to a single company (Missouri 1997, Virginia 2000, New Hampshire 2002).11
In three other cases, the main driver was likely the upcoming gubernatorial election (New York
1998, California 2001, Georgia 2002). The third category includes UI increases resulting from
10 State and year of each event are: FL (1992), MO (1997), NY (1998), VA (2000), CA (2001) TN (2001), GA
(2002), MD (2002), MI (2002), NH (2002), AZ (2004), and AL (2006).
11 These companies are McDonnell Douglas, Tultex and Fraser Papers, respectively. Fraser Papers was headquar-
tered in Canada, so it is not included in the sample. Excluding the remaining two firms does not change the results.
One concern could be that the difficulties these companies were going through were related to broader industry level
demand shocks. However, the matching procedure in practice controls for time-varying industry trends.
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lengthy negotiations between business lobbies and unions, which produced substantial uncertainty
regarding the final outcome (Florida 1992, Tennessee 2001, Michigan 2002, Arizona 2004). The
final group includes policy changes motivated by events unrelated to the local state economy, such
as the expiration of federal funds (Maryland 2002) and political pressure to “match” other states
UI policies (Alabama 2006).
4.3 Matching Procedure
Having identified these reforms, I adopt a standard matching procedure where each firm in a treated
state is matched with a firm similar in terms of several covariates and operating in the same industry
and geographic region. To the extent that treated firms share the same growth opportunities and
operate in relatively homogeneous labor markets relative to firms operating in the same industry
and geographic region, this test should absorb much of the unobserved heterogeneity across firms.
This will force control and treated firms to share similar firm-level covariates, further increasing the
stringency of the test.
I use a logistic regression to estimate the probability of being a treated firm. Propensity scores
are estimated using the levels of the control variables at t-1. Each treatment firm is matched
to a control firm, matching on year, industry, census region, and closest propensity score (with a
maximum difference between propensity scores of 0.01). Ideally, one would like to get as close as
possible to a randomized experiment, where firms similar in terms of observable characteristics,
same industry shocks, and relatively homogeneous labor market conditions are subject to different
UI policies.
The matching is performed with replacement, resulting in a lower number of control firms relative
to those that are treated. The final sample includes 782 firms: 469 treated and 313 control firms.
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As Table 4 shows, the two groups are well-matched in terms of covariates.12 Interestingly, the levels
of the unemployment rate and Log(income) of the states of treated and control firms also do not
differ significantly.
The second Panel of Table 4 tests whether treated firms and control firms differ in terms of the
trends of covariates by comparing their rate of growth between year t-1 and t. The parallel trend
assumption for any of the control variables cannot be dismissed, as well as the state-level controls.
Moreover, all the differences are economically small. In Appendix A.3, I test whether proxies for
analysts’ expectations differ in their trends or levels between treated and control groups. Following
Fresard and Valta (2003) I focus on sell/buy recommendations, earnings per share, and long term
growth forecasts. Again, there is no statistically significant difference between the two sets of firms
in any of the three measures.
The UI reforms announced in year t are associated with sharp and large changes in UI generosity,
as expressed in Panels A and B of Figure 2. Visual evidence shows that treated firms are head-
quartered in states with lower replacement rates and maximum weekly benefits relative to control
firms, but this gap narrows quite sharply afterwards.
In unreported results, using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, I find that total UI
payment increases by 18% in treated states, relative to control states. This suggests that changes in
maximum benefits are strong predictors of actual UI payments. Panel C shows the evolution of the
dividend payout of treated and control companies in the five years surrounding the UI generosity
increases by plotting the mean payout of each subgroup. There is little evidence of anticipation. If
12 In unreported tests, I also find that trends in other potential confounding elements, such as the fact that top
corporate income taxes or UI taxes do not differ between treated and control firms. I obtain corporate taxes from
Heider and Ljunqvist (2015). For the second variable, I follow Di Maggio and Kermani (2015) and compute a simple
approximation of the firm tax schedule as the maximum minus the minimum tax rate in each state. Di Maggio and
Kermani (2015) find that this measure is strongly correlated with an industry-weighted average of Card and Levine
(1994)’s measure of mean marginal tax costs in 1979-1987, constructed using confidential data. Unfortunately, I am
able to construct this proxy only for the latter part of the sample, starting from 2003 onwards, and not for all the
states.
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anything, control firms have a higher payout in year t-2.
Interestingly, the levels of payout across groups are also similar, suggesting that the matching
procedure does quite well in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across treated and control
firms. Payout jumps by about six percentage points in year t+1 in treated firms relative to control
firms. Similarly to the evidence of Figure 1, this gap is reduced in year t+2, up to about 2%,
which suggests that the effect of more generous UI provisions is large but relatively short-lived.
However, the matching procedure requires dividend payout to be defined (and net earnings to
be correspondingly positive) only in years t and t+1, so attrition concerns may invalidate strong
inferences regarding the behavior of firms far from the event year.13
4.4 Evidence from the Matched Sample
Table 5 replicates the baseline tests of Table 2. In this restricted sample, the results are very similar
and, if anything, slightly stronger. Column 1 includes only the UI dummy; column 2 adds industry
fixed-effects; column 3 adds state controls, and column 4 firm-level controls. The inclusion of a
different set of control variables does not affect the point estimate of the coefficient of interest. The
estimates suggest that treated firms increase dividend payout by 5.8 to 6 percentage points.
This effect is larger than what is found in Section 4. One possible reason for this is that some of
the UI increases included in the full sample and excluded here are adopted in anticipation of poor
economic conditions. This may not have been adequately captured by the control variables. If this
is the case, firms may lower dividend payout in order to preserve financial liquidity.
Because the 12 different events correspond to UI revisions different in amount, the tests thus far
described do not allow an easy interpretation of the quantitative effects of UI on payout policies.
To do so, I project changes in UI benefits on the UI dummy, and then regress changes in dividend
13 In particular, while the full sample employed in the regression includes 782 observations, there are only 654
observations in year t-2 and 651 in year t+2.
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payout on the predicted value from this first stage regression in a simple IV framework.
More formally, I first estimate:
∆Benefitss,t+1 = βUIs,t + δ
′∆Xi,t + θ′∆Zs,t + δt + εi,t+1 (2)
where ∆Benefitsi,t+1 is the change in the replacement rate or in the maximum benefit occurring
between year t and t+1 in state s. Then I use the predicted value from this regression ̂∆Benefitsi,t+1
to estimate the following model:
∆DIVi,t+1 = β ̂∆Benefitsi,t+1 + δ′∆Xi,t + θ′∆Zs,t + δt + εi,t+1 (3)
The first two columns of Table 6 reflect the simple OLS regression of growth in dividend payout
on change in benefits (either the change in the maximum amount, in thousands of dollars, or the
change in the replacement rate), plus the usual controls. Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates of
equation 2, with the dependent variable being the growth in maximum benefits or the replacement
rate, respectively.
In both cases the t-statistics are well over 5, suggesting that the instrument is quite strong.
Columns 5 and 6 estimate the IV regression of equation 3. The estimates from the OLS and the
IV models are quite similar, but tend to be larger in the latter case and suggest that a rise in UI
benefits of $1,000, or in the replacement rate of 1% causes an increase in dividend payout of 4.75
basis points, or 1.86%, respectively.
4.5 Additional Payout Measures and Other Outcomes
Table 7 includes results obtained using different measures of payout and additional firm-level out-
comes. Another common measure of payout is total payout, defined as the sum of dividend payment
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and repurchases scaled by earnings (see for example He et al. (2016)). The results, reported in col-
umn 1, are qualitatively similar when using this alternative definition of the dependent variable.
These suggest that an increase in UI generosity causes an increase in total payout of 20% relative
to a standard deviation of 145% in the full sample. Column 3 shows that repurchases (again, scaled
by earnings) do not react to changes in UI in a similar fashion. This is consistent with repurchases
being driven primarily by considerations other than risk, such as temporary mispricing.
One possible concern could be that these results are driven by changes in earnings (the denom-
inator of the dividend payout ratio) rather than actual changes in earnings. Appendix A.3 has
robustness checks that are inconsistent with this alternative explanation. I redefine the dependent
variable as the difference between dividend between periods t+1 and t scaled by earnings in period
t.14 Alternatively, one can scale dividend payments by asset or use the change in dividend per share
as the dependent variable.
Table A3 in the Appendix shows that using either of these three measures as dependent variable
delivers qualitatively similar results. In the same table, I also analyze to which extent UI increases
affect the intensive versus the extensive margin, by splitting the sample according to whether the
firms in the sample have paid any dividends at time t. If such results were driven by a fall in
demand, and so in earnings, we would not expect firms which are not paying dividends in year t
to start doing so in the following year. Table A3, however, shows that the coefficients on the UI
dummy is significant in both subgroups, although with different magnitudes.
Given this evidence, it is natural to ask whether the rise in dividend is associated with a drop
in cash holdings. In column 3, I show that cash (defined as cash and short-term securities scaled
by assets) does indeed drop by 0.007 (with the standard deviation equal to 0.082), although this
14 This approach has the additional advantage of avoiding potential forward-looking bias due to the requirement
that firms have positive earnings in the year that follows the treatment, resulting in the sample size increasing to 983
observations. An alternative way to address this concern consists in adding the contemporaneous change in earnings
as regressor. Including ROAt+1 −ROAt as additional control variable does not affect the results.
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change is not statistically significant. In column 4 I use a more refined measure of cash holding:
“Z-cash” (as in Fresard (2010)), wherein the industry mean is subtracted from the cash holding
and the difference is standardized by the industry standard deviation. This accounts for differences
in cash needs across industries (due to either technological factors or different degrees of market
competition) in a more direct way. The coefficient is now statistically significant at the 5%, and
equal to -0.069, relative to a standard deviation of 0.557.
I also investigate whether higher payout is driven by crowding out of investment due to low
growth opportunities. In columns 5 and 6, where the dependent variables are the change in in-
vestment (defined as capital expenditure scaled by lagged total assets) and growth in employment,
respectively, there is no evidence that this is the case. Both coefficients are small and insignificant.
Ellul et al. (2014) show that, in countries where the UI system is more generous, firm em-
ployment is more sensitive to industry shocks. I follow them in regressing employment growth on
industry revenue growth15 and interact this measure with the UI dummy. Alternatively, I use the
median Q in the industry as a proxy for industry growth opportunities. Intuitively, we expect
both interactions of the coefficients to be positive. As UI becomes more generous, firms should
have fewer incentives to smooth fluctuations in employment, and so will be more likely to exploit
potential profit opportunities.16
In columns 7 and 8 of Table 7, both measures are de-meaned and divided by their standard
deviation for ease of interpretation. As expected, both coefficients are positive and relatively large,
although the coefficient for the interaction between industry sale growth and the UI dummy is
not significant. The coefficients on the non-interacted industry proxies are omitted for brevity.
The coefficient for the interaction term between median industry Q and the UI dummy is, on the
15 Following Sraer and Thesmar (2007), I compute the mean rate of growth for all industry in a given industry
and year rather than computing the growth in total sales to account for attrition among listed firms.
16 Each proxy is also included in the regressions as standalone variable (not shown).
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other hand, large and significant. This suggests that firms in industries with a median Q one
standard deviation above the mean increase employment by 4.8% if headquartered in states with a
UI increase.
In Appendix A.3, I also test whether UI generosity is associated with an increase in leverage.17
Consistent with Agrawal and Matsa (2013), who find that the positive association between leverage
and UI generosity is driven primarily by firms with low cash flow, I find no evidence of a change
in leverage for treated firms in my sample, all of which are required to have positive earnings
(column 1 of Table A4). When I repeat the matching procedure outlined in Section 4.3 on firms
with negative earnings and re-estimate equation 1 in this sample of firms, I find that firms in the
treatment group increase book leverage by 2.2% (relative to a standard deviation of 25.25% in the
dependent variable). This effect is only marginally statistically significant (t-statistic=1.73). I also
estimate the same model using net leverage as a dependent variable, which subtracts cash holding
from the numerator. This measure is of additional interest, given the evidence on cash holding and
total payout presented in Table 7. I find that net leverage drops by 3.1% (t-statistic=2.42), which
is about a tenth of a standard deviation of the dependent variable (equal to 29.9%) in the negative
earnings subsample but, again, I find no effet among firms with positive earnings.
5 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity
5.1 Volatility in Real Activities
This section contains a number of cross-sectional tests giving empirical support to the hypothesis
that conservative payout policies are related to the desire of managers to provide insurance to work-
ers in presence of unemployment risk. To be conservative, I focus on the matched sample, selected
17 The construction of book leverage follows Baker and Wurgler (2002); see details in Table A1 in Appendix A.1.
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according to the procedure outlined in Section 4.3. Results are largely similar when extending the
analysis to the full sample considered in Section 4.1.
First, I hypothesize that the effect of UI generosity will be weaker in industries where firms
expect to enjoy relatively stable earnings streams. Committing to a high dividend policy is unlikely
to reduce operating flexibility in such firms because severe negative shocks are unlikely to occur
(Jagannathan et al. (2000)). Following Brealey, Hodges, and Capron (1976) and other authors,
including more recent work by Matsa (2010), I construct a simple measure of earnings variability
by taking the standard deviation of the change in ROA for each firm in Compustat computed over
the full sample period and requiring at least five observations per firm. I then average this measure
across firms belonging to the same industry. The theoretical justification for using this measure is
related to work by Baily (1974), who argues that firms may have incentives to stabilize workers’
employment, primarily when facing frequent spells of high or low demand, also reflected in earnings.
I also construct more direct measures, aimed at proxying for employment volatility, its input
being the change in Log(employment), to capture the actual unemployment risk faced by workers.
The two measures exhibit a strong positive association (the correlation coefficient is 64.6%) but are
related to different aspects of industry-level risk.
I then replicate the main analysis of Section 4.4 in four distinct subgroups by sorting firms
according to whether the industry or the employment volatility proxies are above or below the
sample median and compare the coefficients of interest. Table 8 shows evidence consistent with the
expected pattern. In particular, the coefficient on the UI dummy more than doubles when moving
from low to high volatility industries and is significant only in the latter two subgroups.
The last two rows of the table report χ2-statistics computed under the null hypothesis that
the two coefficients are equal, along with their p-values. Even though such tests do not reject




Firms lacking encouraging growth prospects are likely to respond strongly to changes in unemploy-
ment costs. They may have high incentives to issue dividend from the start: companies that are
performing well are unlikely to reinvest the proceeds of previous investments if their growth oppor-
tunities are scarce. Moreover, free cash flow concerns may be relevant, as managers may be tempted
to use their internal funds to finance “pet projects” or diversify their personal risk through invest-
ments unrelated to their core business activity (Gormley and Matsa (2016)). More importantly, in
these firms workers face higher unemployment risk because of their poor performance.
In the analysis that follows, I employ three proxies for growth opportunities. The first is sim-
ply a firm’s Tobin’s Q, which is likely to be most appropriate because it incorporates investors’
expectations about future investment opportunities. I also employ two backward looking measures
based on earnings: the current ROA and the current change in ROA (that is, ROAt − ROAt−1).
Importantly, all three measures are strong predictors of future employment growth.18
For each year I sort firms according to whether each proxy for growth opportunities is above or
below the sample median. Results of this exercise are in Table 9. The coefficient on the UI dummy
is about three times larger when moving from the low versus high Q firms (3.15 versus 10.08), and
is five times larger when moving from the low versus high ROA firms (2.096 versus 10.74). The
UI coefficient is, instead, slightly negative in the high ROA growth group, relative to 15.54 in the
low ROA growth group. These differences are statistically significant at conventional levels, except
when firms are sorted according to Q (p-value of the χ2-statistic=0.061).
18 I test this hypothesis by regressing the change in Log(employment) between t+1 and t on each of the three
measures separately, and on firm and year dummies. A decline of a standard deviation in Q, ROA and ∆ROA
is associated with a fall in employment growth equal to 4.16%, 2.83% and 0.87%. These coefficients are highly
statistically significant.
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5.3 Evidence on the Labor Channel
A more direct test of the labor insurance channel consists in examining the response of firms that
differ in terms of workers’ importance to their production function. I expect firms that use labor
more heavily to be more affected by changes in UI generosity. I follow Serfling (2016) and use the
number of employees, scaled by either assets or property, plants, and equipment (PP&E) as proxies
for labor intensity. Table 10 shows that, once sorting by either measure, the coefficient on the UI
dummy is significant only in the high labor intensity firms, and almost triples in magnitude relative
to the low labor intensity firms.
The effect of insurance policies on corporate decisions is likely to be shaped by the underlying
structure of the labor market and, in particular, by the probability of being quickly re-employed.
Indeed, as Anderson and Meyer (1997) document, many unemployed workers do not take any UI
benefits because they are likely to find a new job in a relatively short period of time.
Intuitively, this should be true especially in industries where labor demand is falling. I proxy
for trends in labor demand by measuring the percentage rate of change in employment in each
industry. In addition, because the welfare gain from being re-employed after a layoff depends also
on how attractive a job is in terms of wage offers, I also analyze the effect of UI generosity on payout
in industries with different average wage growth. I construct measures of employment and wage
growth at the industry level (at the 4-digit NAICS level), using data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Table 11 analyzes the response of payout policies in different industries, sorting as usual in two
groups according to either characteristic (employment growth or wage growth). The coefficient
on the UI dummy is significant only in low employment and wage growth industries (coefficients
are 10.06 and 12.82, respectively), whereas UI generosity is unrelated to payout policies in better
performing industries. The differences in the coefficients across subgroups are not only economically
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large but also statistically significant, as shown in the last two rows of Table 11.
5.4 Alternative Interpretations
Although results so far are consistent with an implicit contract interpretation, different conjectures
are possible. Feldstein (1976) suggests that UI acts as an implicit subsidy to firms with large
seasonal shifts in demand. Such firms can temporarily lay off workers during low demand spells
and re-hire them in periods of high demand. A rise in UI payments improves workers’ well-being
during periods of temporary unemployment, enabling employers to pay lower wages when workers
are re-hired.
In Table 12, columns 1 and 2, I sort firms according to their degree of sales seasonality. I measure
seasonality as the standard deviation of the Log(revenues) changes in the previous four quarters. If
anything, low seasonality firms seem to respond with greater intensity to higher UI, although this
effect is not very precisely estimated.
A second possibility is that higher UI increases workers’ bargaining power by raising their reser-
vation wages. Managers may be willing to reduce a firm’s liquidity in order to gain a stronger
bargaining position and avoid wage concessions, as in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991). Although
it is not obvious how to rule out this possibility, it is plausible that unionized workers, thanks to
their superior organization, may be more likely to exploit this advantage in the bargaining process.
As Agrawal and Matsa (2013) note, employed workers would not be eligible for UI payments if
they refused to work when denied a wage raise, but UI provisions may still affect wage negotia-
tions for unionized workers. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 12 I sort firms according to the degree




In this paper, I have argued that firms engage in conservative payout policies partly to protect
workers from the unemployment risk that derives from concerns about a firm’s operating flexibility.
Consistent with this hypothesis, firms increase payout following increases in UI generosity, which
provide meaningful shocks to human costs from unemployment. This evidence on payout policies
complements previous work on leverage, earnings management, and sensitivity of employment to
industry shocks. Cross-sectional tests support this conjecture by focusing on heterogeneity in firms
across several dimensions, such as labor intensity, volatility in real activities, growth prospects, and
labor opportunities for unemployed workers. Furthermore, alternative, plausible hypotheses do not
find support in the data.
I suggest two possible extensions to this work. It may be worthwhile to test whether these re-
sults hold worldwide. More generally, it would be interesting to ask how much of the cross-country
heterogeneity in financial policies (cash holding, leverage, payout, etc.) is explained by unemploy-
ment regulations, which would complement recent work that uses cross-country data (Simintzi et al.
(2015) and Ellul et al. (2014) among others).
Second, this paper has hypothesized that labor market considerations affect the cost of issuing
dividends. In principle, they could also shape the benefits deriving from such choices. For example,
managers may screen for risk-loving workers by adopting riskier financial policies. This and other
hypotheses would require more refined matched employee-employer data to be tested.
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7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1
UI Generosity and Payout around Policy Changes: Full Sample
Panels A, B and C of Figure 1 plot the yearly means of maximum benefits,
replacement rate and dividend payout, respectively, for treated (solid line)
and control (dotted line) firms in the five years surrounding a UI increase
(see Section 3.1 for details.)
Panel A. Replacement Rate
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UI Generosity and Payout around Policy Changes:
Matched Sample
Panels A, B and C of Figure 2 plot the yearly means of maximum benefits,
replacement rate and dividend payout, respectively, for treated (solid line)
and control (dotted line) firms in the five years surrounding a UI increase (see
Section 3.1 for details). The sample includes only firms selected according to
the procedure outlined in Section 4.3.
Panel A. Replacement Rate






Panel B. Maximum Benefits ($1000s)






Panel C. Dividend Payout









Table 1 presents the variables used in the firm-level regressions. Dividend payout is defined as
common dividend over net income. Total payout is defined as commond dividend plus repurchases,
all divided by net income. Investment is defined as capital expenditures divided by lagged total
assets. Debt to assets is defined as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, all divided by total
assets. Q is defined as total assets plus market value of the firm (number of shares outstanding ×
fiscal year-end price) minus common value of equity, all divided by total assets. ROA is earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by lagged total assets. UI is a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm’s headquarter is in a state that experienced a UI benefit increase of at least
$100 (see Section 3.1 for details). Log(Income) is the logarithm of the per capita income at the state
level. Unemployment is the state level unemployment. Max benefits is defined as maximum number
of weeks of unemployment coverage times maximum benefit. ∆ is the first-difference operator.
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. 1st P. 99th P.
Dividend Payout 22,595 15.582 0 23.548 0 79.944
Q 22,595 2.115 1.639 1.762 0.715 8.463
Debt to Assets 22,595 0.198 0.172 0.184 0 0.722
ROA 22,595 0.097 0.076 0.105 0.002 0.430
Log(Assets) 22,595 5.830 5.702 1.867 2.361 10.504
Investment 22,595 7.384 4.947 8.002 0.201 48.620
Log(Employees) 22,286 0.614 0.543 1.804 -3.612 4.850
Total Payout 21,287 0.549 0.211 0.995 0 6.745
UI 22,595 0.056 0.000 0.231 0 1
Max Benefits 22,595 14,503 14,303 1,755 11,595 17,531
Max Benefits / Income 22,595 0.402 0.397 0.050 0.296 0.523
∆Dividend Payout 22,595 0.322 0 41.008 -191.787 201.881
∆Q 22,595 0.025 0.025 0.790 -2.837 2.726
∆Debt to Assets 22,595 -0.008 -0.004 0.079 -0.250 0.280
∆Cash Flow 22,595 0.022 0.007 0.089 -0.182 0.412
∆ Log(Assets) 22,595 0.149 0.098 0.219 -0.256 1.085
∆Investment 22,595 0.031 0.012 5.212 -21.307 19.940
∆Log(Employees) 22,197 8.373 5.009 20.059 -44.274 90.441
∆Total Payout 20,832 6.986 0 132.812 -574.353 710.092
35
Table 2
UI and Payout: Baseline Results
Table 2 reports regressions of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged
changes in Q, Log(assets), debt to assets, ROA, Log(income) and unemployment rate.
Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Each regression
includes state and year dummies and, when indicated, industry dummies (defined
according to the two digits SIC classification). Standard errors, clustered at the state
level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the
10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UI 3.597** 3.582** 3.619** 3.544** 4.214**
(1.477) (1.490) (1.494) (1.522) (1.883)
∆Log(Income) -0.155 -0.152 -0.147 -0.126
(0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.133)
∆Unemployment 0.714 0.704 0.688 0.626
(0.628) (0.626) (0.627) (0.725)
∆Log(Assets) 4.731*** 6.982***
(0.958) (1.553)




∆Cash Flow 13.36*** 22.70***
(2.856) (4.164)
Observations 22,595 22,595 22,595 22,595 21,970
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.069
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
State FE YES YES YES YES YES
State Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES
Firm Controls NO NO NO YES YES
Firm FE NO NO NO NO YES
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Table 3
UI and Payout: Robustness Checks
Table 3 reports regressions of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged changes
in Q, Log(assets), debt to assets, ROA, Log(income) and unemployment rate. Please refer to
the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Each regression includes state, year and
industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC classification). Column 2 includes
in the sample dispersed industries (wholesale, trade and retail). Column 3 includes only firms
headquartered in states which are eventually subject to a UI increase during the sample (26
states). Column 4 includes industry-year region fixed effects. Column 5 includes industry-
year-census region fixed effects. Column 6 replaces the UI dummy with the fraction of firm’s
workers in states covered by a UI increase. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10% 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline With Disp. Only Year-Ind. Reg.-Ind. Fraction
Industries Treated FE -Year FE Treated
UI 3.544** 2.590* 3.165** 3.650*** 3.511*** 4.643**
(1.522) (1.514) (1.444) (1.361) (1.216) (1.781)
Observations 22,595 27,336 13,143 22,553 22,200 18,092
R-squared 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.053 0.130 0.012
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 4
Treated VS Control Firms: Summary Statistics
Table 4 reports means of control variables of treated and control firms, matched according to
the procedure outlined in Section 4.3. Variables definitions are in Appendix A.1. ∆ is the first
difference operator.
Treated Control Treated - Control
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Obs.=469 Obs.=313 Obs.=782
Log(Assets) 5.657 5.580 0.076
(0.152) (0.094) (0.159)
Debt to Assets 0.203 0.211 -0.008
(0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
ROA 0.075 0.072 0.002
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
Q 2.217 2.085 0.131
(0.130) (0.081) (0.149)
Log(Income) 10.32 10.29 0.032
(0.051) (0.033) (0.055)
Unemployment Rate 5.334 4.819 0.514
(0.418) (0.209) (0.488)
∆Log(Assets) 0.124 0.135 -0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
∆Debt to Assets -0.012 -0.005 -0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
∆ROA 0.015 0.019 -0.003
(0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
∆Q -0.108 -0.023 -0.084
(0.043) (0.050) (0.069)
∆Log(Income) 5.259 4.578 0.680
(1.101) (0.257) (1.141)




UI and Payout: Evidence from Matched Sample
Table 5 reports regressions of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged
changes in Q, Log(assets), debt to assets, ROA, Log(income) and unemployment
rate. Each regression includes year and industry dummies (defined according to the
two digits SIC classification). The sample comprises matched and treated firms that
experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In the year before a UI increase
treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total assets and
industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard
errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UI 5.796** 6.025*** 5.905*** 6.004***













Observations 782 782 782 782
R-squared 0.005 0.071 0.071 0.074
Year FE NO YES YES YES
Industry FE NO YES YES YES
State Controls NO NO YES YES




Table 6 reports, in the first two columns, regressions of changes in dividend payout on changes
in the maximum benefit (column 1) and in the replacement rate (column 2). Columns 3 and
4 report regressions of changes in maximum benefit (column 3) and in the replacement rate
(column 4) on a UI dummy. Columns 5 and 6 report IV regressions of changes in dividend
payout on changes in the maximum benefit (column 5) and in the replacement rate (column
6), where the instrument is the UI dummy. All regressions include, as control variables, lagged
changes in Q, Log(assets), debt to assets, ROA, Log(income), unemployment rate, year and
industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC classification). The sample comprises
matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In the year
before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total
assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard
errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.





∆ Ben. / Inc.
IV IV
∆ Max Benefit 2.905** 4.745***
(1.310) (1.665)




Observations 782 782 782 782 782 782
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.702 0.699 0.071 0.071
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 7
Evidence on Additional Outcomes
Table 7 reports regressions of changes in several dependent variables on a UI dummy and lagged
changes in Q, ROA, debt to assets, Log(assets), logarithm of state income per capita, unemployment
rate, year and industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC classification). The model is
estimated in first differences. The dependent variables are: total payout (dividend plus repurchases,
all divided by net income) in column 1, repurchases (repurchases divided by net income) in column
2, cash (defined as cash over total assets) in column 3, Z-cash (defined as cash over total asset minus
the industry mean and divided by the industry standard deviation) in column 4, investment (capital
expenditures divided by lagged total assets) in column 5, Log(employees) in column 6. The sample
comprises matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In the
year before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total
assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard errors,
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.





Repurch. Cash Z-Cash Invest. Empl. Empl. Empl.
UI 20.808** 0.074 -0.007 -0.069** 0.003 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011
(9.183) (0.055) (0.006) (0.033) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
UI × Ind. 0.018
Growth (0.017)
UI × Ind. 0.048***
Q (0.012)
Observations 718 718 781 772 782 773 773 773
R-squared 0.105 0.118 0.022 0.063 0.196 0.180 0.182 0.193
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Contr. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Contr. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 8
Heterogeneity in Industry Volatility
Table 8 reports regression of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged changes in
Q, ROA, debt to assets, Log(assets), the logarithm of state income per capita and unemployment
rate. Each regression includes year and industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC
classification). Firms are sorted according to whether their earnings volatility (columns 1 and 2) and
amployment volatility (columns 5 and 6) are above or below the yearly median. Each measure is
computed by calculating the standard deviation of the rate of change of each measure for each firm
over the sample period and then averaging firm-level standard deviations at the industry level. The
sample comprises matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In
the year before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total
assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard errors,
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Earnings Low Earnings High Employment Low Employment
Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility
UI 9.360*** 3.956 8.708*** 3.866
(1.873) (2.957) (2.912) (3.133)
Observations 321 461 366 416
R-squared 0.063 0.097 0.087 0.103
State Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
χ2-Stat (p-value) 3.32* (0.068) 1.22 (0.269)
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Table 9
Heterogeneity in Growth Prospects
Table 9 reports regressions of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged changes in
Q, ROA, debt to assets, Log(assets), the logarithm of state income per capita and unemployment
rate. Each regression includes year and industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC
classification). Firms are sorted according to whether their Q (columns 1 and 2), ROA (columns 3
and 4) and lagged change in ROA (columns 5 and 6) are above or below the yearly median. The
sample comprises matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007.
In the year before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to
total assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard
errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.















UI 3.149** 10.080** 2.096 10.740*** -0.807 12.539***
(1.358) (3.763) (2.109) (3.638) (2.208) (3.554)
Observations 389 393 389 393 389 393
R-squared 0.091 0.117 0.104 0.156 0.220 0.114
State Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
χ2-Stat (p-value) 3.50* (0.0614) 5.18** (0.023) 14.64*** (0.000)
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Table 10
Heterogeneity in Labor Intensity
Table 10 reports regression of dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged changes in Q, ROA,
debt to assets, Log(assets), the logarithm of state income per capita and unemployment rate.
Each regression includes year and industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC
classification). Firms are sorted according to whether their labor intensity is above or below the
yearly median. Labor intensity is measured in columns 1 and 2 as number of employees divided by
property, plant and equipment; in columns 3 and 4 it is defined as number of employees divided
by total assets. The sample comprises matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase
between 1991 and 2007. In the year before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s
Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a
definition of the variables. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
Employees/Assets Employees/Assets Employees/PP&E Employees/PP&E
UI 9.788*** 3.362 10.464*** 3.845
(2.987) (4.206) (2.129) (3.626)
Observations 392 390 393 389
R-squared 0.088 0.160 0.212 0.101
State Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
χ2-Stat (p-value) 1.64 (0.200) 2.73* (0.098)
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Table 11
Heterogeneity in Labor Market Conditions
Table 11 reports regression of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged changes in
Q, ROA, debt to assets, Log(assets), the logarithm of state income per capita and unemployment
rate. Each regression includes year and industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC
classification). Firms are sorted according to whether they belong to industries whose employment
growth (columns 1 and 2) or wage growth (columns 3 and 4) are above or below the yearly median.
The sample comprises matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007.
In the year before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total
assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard errors,
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at
the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Employment High Employment Low Wage High Wage
Growth Growth Growth Growth
UI 12.062*** -1.249 10.819*** 0.658
(2.328) (3.606) (2.575) (2.691)
Observations 393 374 392 375
R-squared 0.102 0.148 0.165 0.094
State Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES




Unionization and Demand Seasonality
Table 12 reports regressions of changes in dividend payout on a UI dummy and lagged changes in
Q, ROA, debt to assets, Log(assets), the logarithm of state income per capita and unemployment
rate. Each regression includes year and industry dummies (defined according to the two digits
SIC classification). Firms are sorted according to whether they belong to states whose average
unionization level (columns 1 and 2) is above or below the yearly median, or whether their sales
seasonality (measures as the standard deviation of the Log change in quarterly revenues in the
previous year (columns 3 and 4) is above or below the yearly median. The sample comprises
matched and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In the year
before a UI increase treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total
assets and industry. Please refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard
errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
Unionization Unionization Seasonality Seasonality
UI 5.358* 6.905*** 5.263 5.980**
(2.901) (2.374) (3.866) (2.415)
Observations 350 432 389 393
R-squared 0.100 0.075 0.165 0.082
State Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
χ2-Stat (p-value) 0.23 (0.633) 0.03 (0.860)
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A Appendix
This Appendix has additional results and details omitted from the main text for the sake of brevity.
Appendix A.1 gives definitions and sources of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Appendix A.2 pprovides a brief synopsis of the 12 UI benefit increases considered in the text,
and of the 6 excluded. Appendix A.3 includes additional robustness checks and evidence on the
relationship between UI generosity and leverage.
A.1 Data Definitions
Table A1
Variables Definitions and Sources
This table has definitions and data sources of the main variables used in the paper. Compustat items are
in italic.
Variable Definition Source
Dividend Payout Common Dividend (dvc) divided by Net
Income (ni)
Compustat
Total Payout Common Dividend (dvc) plus Repurchases
(prstkc), all divided by Net Income (ni)
Compustat
Debt to Assets Long-Term Debt (dltt) plus Debt in Current
Liabilities (dlc), all divided by Total Assets
Compustat
Investment Capital Expenditures (capx ) divided by
lagged Total Assets (at)
Compustat
ROA Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,
Depreciation and Amortization (ebitda)
divided by lagged Total Assets (at)
Compustat
Cash Cash and Short-Term Investments (che)
divided by Total Assets (at)
Compustat
Repurchase Repurchases (prstkc) divided by Net Income
(ni)
Compustat
Z-Cash Cash minus the average cash within the
industry divided by its standard deviation
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Cash Flow Net Income (ni) divided by lagged Total
Assets (at)
Compustat
Leverage Book Debt divided by Total Assets (at).
Book Debt is defined as Total Assets minus
Book Equity. Book Equity is Total Assets
Total Liabilities (lt) minus Preferred Stock
(pstk) + Deferred Taxes (txdb) plus
Convertible Debt (dcvt). If Preferred Stock
Variable is missing, Redemption Value of
Preferred Stock (pstkrv) is used instead.
Compustat
Leverage Book Debt (defined as in the variable





Average of the firm standard deviation of
change in Log(Employment) (emp)
computed across all firms in each industry
(defined at the 2-digits SIC level) between
1991 and 2007. Only firms with at least 5
non-missing observations are kept.
Compustat
Earnings Volatility Average of the firm standard deviation of
change in ROA computed across all firms in
each industry (defined at the 2-digits SIC
level) between 1991 and 2007. Only firms
with at least 5 non-missing observations are
kept.
Compustat
Q Total Assets plus Market Value of Equity
(csho × prcc f ) minus Common Value of
Equity (ceq), all divided by Total Assets
Compustat
Labor Intensity Number of employees (emp) divided by
either Total Assets (at) or Property, Plant
and Equipment (ppent)
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Seasonality Standard Deviation of change in the
logarithm of quarterly revenues (saleq) over
the year
Compustat Quarterly
EPS Last analysts’ consensus (average) forecast
of earning per share preceding the end of
the firm fiscal year divided by share price at
the end of the fiscal year
I/B/E/S and CRSP
Recommendation Last analysts’ consensus (average)
recommendation preceding the end of the
firm fiscal year on a 1 (strong sell) to 5
(strong buy) scale
I/B/E/S
LT Growth Last analysts’ consensus (average) forecast
of long term earnings growth preceding the
end of the firm fiscal year
I/B/E/S
Income State Income per Capita US Bureau of Economic Analysis
UI A dummy equal to 1 if the firm’s
headquarter is in a state that experiences
an increase in the maximum unemployment
benefit of at least $100 (in 2010 dollars)
Elaborations from “Changes in
Unemployment Insurance
Legislation” in several editions of
the “Monthly Labor Reviews”
(Bureau of Labor Statistics)
Unionization State Union Coverage Density Hirsch and Macpherson
UnionStats Database
Unemployment Rate State Unemployment Rate US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Industry Wage
Growth
Yearly Percentage Average Wage Growth at
the industry level (defined at the 4-digits
NAICS level)
US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Industry Employment
Growth
Yearly Percentage Employment Growth at
the industry level (defined at the 4-digits
NAICS level)
US Bureau of Labor Statistics
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A.2 Case Studies
In this Appendix I reconstruct briefly the political environment surrounding the twelve UI changes
for which I was able to obtain sufficient information through newswire and articles searches in Fac-
tiva, Lexis Nexis and Google. I also add some details regarding concurrent policies adopted. I first
describe the 12 events which I judged unconnected to macroeconomic or unrelated to the adoption
of significant additional policies, and then the 6 excluded events. More details about the screening
criteria are in Section 4.3.
Selected Events
(1) Florida 1992
Maximum Unemployment benefits was raised from $225 to $250 a week. For the previous 11 years,
lawmakers had increased the benefit cap every few years in $25 increments. The measure passed
the Senate with a close vote (18-16) because some senators had originally proposed a percentage
increase anchored to the average statewide weekly wage. The proposal was rejected as it would have
implied an automatic increase each year. The increase was estimated to cost $37 million out of the
$104 million of Unemployment Benefits Trust Fund. (Source: St. Petersburg Times, 06/06/1992)
(2) Missouri 1997
Missouri increased maximum payment from $175 to $205, to increase $15 a year up to $250 in 2001.
The most recent increase was in 1992, by $5. The bill was a compromise between business lobbies
and unions motivated by the strikes occurred the same year at the McDonnell Douglas plant, where
many business groups were outraged when the state granted benefits to strikers. Under the new
bill, workers’ representatives accepted that no benefits would be paid to strikers, but obtained the
raise in the maximum weekly cap. (Source: St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 05/21/1997)
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(3) New York 1998
On August 14th, Governor Pataki, at that time running for re-election, signed into law raising
maximum unemployment benefits from $300 to $365 per week, with an additional increase in 2000
up to one-half the state’s average weekly wage. It was the first increase in six years. The law was
the outcome of negotiations with the AFL-CIO and the Business Council of New York state, a
lobbying group representing corporate interests. The new law also put in place a wage reporting
system, in which computerized information from the state tax department will be used to verify
wages, a system less prone to fraud. New York had been the only state in the nation not using a
wage reporting system at that time. (Source: Buffalo News, 08/14/1998)
(4) Virginia 2000
Governor Gilmor signed the so-called “Tultex bill,” a reference to the textile company that laid
off 2,000 workers. The bill initially was meant to boost unemployment benefits and provide health
insurance for unemployed textile workers. Both Gilmor and the Republicans congressmen felt it
would be unfair to raise jobless benefits for Virginians in some parts of the state and not others.
After a lengthy political battle, a bill backed by Gilmore that raised the maximum weekly unem-
ployment benefits by $36, to $268, passed the legislature. (Sources: KRTBN Knight Ridder Tribune
Business News, 04/20/2000; Associated Press Writer, 03/11/2000)
(5) California 2001
On October 1st, Governor Davis signed a legislation boosting unemployment benefits by $100 a
week starting from January 1, 2002, the first raise in nine years. Davis vetoed a similar legisla-
tion the previous year but, lagging in public opinion polls, was seeking to shore up support from
organized labor, which had made an increase in unemployment benefits one of its top priorities.
The bill established additional increases amounting in $40 per week each year until 2005, when the
maximum unemployment insurance check reached $450 per week. No increase in UI taxes were
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expected in the near future because, as a result of the booming economy in the late 1990s, Califor-
nia’s unemployment insurance trust fund amounted to more than $6 billion. (Source: Los Angeles
Times, 10/01/2001)
(6) Tennessee 2001
The legislation signed by Governor Sundquist increased the maximum weekly unemployment ben-
efit by $20 to $275. This was part of a compromise with lobbyists for labor and business. Union
leaders obtained the increase and accepted that certain companies would continue getting state-
funded training for their workers under the state Job Skills program for another five years. (Source:
Associated Press Newswires, 07/06/2001)
(7) Georgia 2002
Governor Barnes approved and increase in unemployment benefits to be phased in over two calendar
years to $300 per week from the current $284. In 2003, benefits went up by $6 a week, followed by
a $10 increase during 2004. Because of a healthy state’s fund, no increases in unemployment taxes
were foreseen. The main additional provision was a sales-tax holiday for clothing, school supplies,
and computer equipment, in an attempt to curry favor with Georgia businesses during Barnes’
(failed) re-election campaign. (Source: Associated Press Newswires, 02/06/2002)
(8) Maryland 2002
Maximum unemployment benefits were increased by $30 (from $280 to $310) as a result of protests
by unemployed workers and their families in conjunction with union, community, and religious lead-
ers. All parties petitioned for more generous unemployment insurance following the $143 million
the state Unemployment Insurance system received as a result of the economic stimulus bill passed
by the US Congress. Had the Assembly not taken action before their April 8th session, the infusion
of the new federal funds would have triggered an automatic reduction in the unemployment taxes
paid by state employers. (Source: U.S. Newswire, 03/28/2002)
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(9) Michigan 2002
Maximum unemployment benefits were increased by $62 (from $300 to $362) by Governor Engler,
the first time since 1995. The law passed after weeks of debate and failed deals, with one GOP
House member even losing his committee chairmanships in the political dispute and more than 1,500
workers protesting the delay in the benefit increase on the Capitol lawn. The most controversial
point was the “waiting week” requested by Republican legislator and business lobbies, which was
opposed by unions. The legislation in the end did not include such provision but reduced the max-
imum cap to $362, relative to the initially planned $415. No other provisions regarding taxes were
included in the bill. (Sources: Associated Press, 04/19/2002, 04/26/2002; U-Wire, 08/05/2002)
(10) New Hampshire 2002
New Hampshire increased the maximum benefits cap from $331 to $372. Governor Jeanne Sha-
heen, who would soon be involved in the state Senate elections, urged lawmakers to act on the bill.
Among the reasons cited were the layoffs of mill workers in the Berlin area that had occurred the
previous year. No tax increases were expected to occur. (Source: Associated Press, 02/13/2002)
(11) Arizona 2004
Governor Napolitano signed a legislation increasing maximum unemployment benefits from $205 to
$240 in April 2004, after she vetoed a similar bill during the previous year. The bill was declared
dead by a Republican congresswoman, as unions and business groups lobbies could not find an
agreement. A business lobby obtained the inclusion of stricter eligibility restrictions on payment of
unemployment benefits while former employees receive severance pay, whereas unions condensed an
initially planned two-step increase in an immediate boost of maximum claim. (Sources: Associated
Press, 04/02/2004, 03/17/2004, 04/07/2004, 05/17/2004)
(12) Alabama 2006
Governor Riley signed into a low a bill raising the maximum cap from $220 to $230 (and to $235
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the following year). No other provision were included in the bill. According to the president of
the Alabama AFL-CIO “the legislation was needed because Mississippi had decided to raise its
lowest-in-the nation unemployment compensation rate, and Alabama would have become the low-
est paying state.” (Source: Associated Press, 04/17/2006)
Excluded Events
(1) Florida 1997
Governor Chiles approved an increase in the maximum weekly benefit of $25 (from $250 to $275).
The idea was suggested first by unofficial gubernatorial candidate Jeb Bush, who, given the large
surplus in the state unemployment fund, suggested a one year $158 million tax cut. The bill also had
tax cuts for new businesses. In order to appeal to labor advocates, however, the bill also included
an increase in the weekly benefit cap. Some labor advocates and a few Democrat House members
argued that the bill was disproportionately favoring businesses over workers. (Sources: Associated
Press, 04/18/1997; St. Petersburg Times, 03/07/1997)
(2) Louisiana 1997
Louisiana increased maximum unemployment benefits from $193 to $215 following a compromise
between labor and business unions regarding how to employ the state trust fund, which had reached
over $1 billion. After an initial request made by unions of an increase up to $230, closer to the
southern average, the measure passed, together with a reduction in employers’ unemployment taxes
and a worker training fund for businesses. (Sources: Associated Press, 04/18/1997, 09/19/1997)
(3) Arizona 1998
Governor Hull signed a legislation increasing weekly benefits from $185 to $195 in 1999 and $205 in
2000. The decision was part of a large-scale plan for business tax cuts, including one in the vehicle
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license tax, an increase in exemptions for personal income taxes, and cuts in personal income tax
as well. As a political compromise, Democrats managed to add a provision to increase state pay-
ments to unemployed workers. (Sources: Associated Press, 03/17/1998, 03/25/1998, 04/16/1998,
04/24/1998)
(4) Kentucky 1998
Maximum unemployment benefits were increased $32 (from $256 to $288) by Governor Patton.
The legislation was made possible by the healthy state of the UI fund (which had risen to $555
million, well above the $350 million required by the Kentucky law), which had a $24 million surplus
and was accompanied by reduction in the UI tax rates. (Sources: Associated Press, 02/04/1998,
03/23/1998; Capital Markets Report, 03/24/1998)
(5) Georgia 1999
Maximum unemployment benefits were increased by $40 in Georgia, jointly with the approval of
a large-scale four-year tax cut put forward by Governor Roy Barnes. This was part of his first
year legislative agenda, and was made possible by the fact that state’s unemployment reserve
held in Washington was at about $2 billion. Similar tax cuts were approved by other Southern
states (Florida, Virginia, South Carolina and North Carolina). (Sources: The Atlanta Constitution,
04/28/1999; Associated Press, 04/27/1999)
(6) Alabama 2002
In April, Alabama increased the maximum weekly cap by $20 (from $190 to $210) due to pressure
from labor unions (Alabama was still at the last place in the country) and thanks also to $111 mil-
lion from a federal economic stimulus package to help the unemployed. Business lobbies would have
accepted an even larger increase, but requested a one-week waiting period before laid-off workers
could qualify, which was rejected by unions. Although initially no tax change was foreseen, a later
change to slightly increasing UI taxes was approved. (Source: Associated Press, 04/17/2002)
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A.3 Additional Results and Robustness Checks
This Appendix has additional robustness checks. Table A2 shows that analysts forecasts for the
treated and control firms selected according to the procedure outlined in Section 4.3 do not differ
prior to the UI changes. Following Fresard and Valta (2003), I consider three measures: average
sell/buy recommendation (which varies between 1 and 5, with higher values corresponding to more
optimistic forecasts), average of earnings per share forecast standardized by the stock price at the
end of the fiscal year, and average Long Term Growth, which is the mean 5-years growth earnings
forecast. None of the differences in mean are statistically significant.
In Table A3, I employ three alternative measures of change in dividend payout as dependent
variables. In column 1 the dependent variable is the change in common dividend between year t+1
and year t, all scaled by net earnings. In column 2 the dependent variable is the change in dividend
over total assets. Column 3 is the change in dividend per share. Results are qualitatively similar
to those of Table 5. In columns 4 and 5 I split the sample according to whether the firms in the
sample have paid any dividends at time t.
Un Table A4 I use, as dependent variables, the change in book leverage and net leverage. In
columns 3 and 4 equation 1 is estimated on a sample of treated and control firms with negative
earnings in year t. The matching procedure is identical to that described in Section 4.3.
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Table A2
Treated VS Control Firms: Analysts’ Forecasts
Table A2 reports means of control variables of treated and control firms, matched according
to the procedure outlined in Section 4.3. Variables definitions are in Appendix A.1. ∆ is the
first difference operator.
Treated Control Treated - Control
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Recommendation 1.989 2.038 -0.048
(0.045) (0.045) (0.072)
Growth 18.66 18.15 0.507
(1.383) (0.619) (1.465)
Earnings 0.043 0.041 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
∆Recommendation -0.007 -0.000 -0.007
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
∆Growth 0.001 0.045 -0.044
(0.025) (0.032) (0.037)




Alternative Payout Measures and
Intensive VS Extensive Margin
Table A3 reports regressions of different measures of change in dividend payout on a UI dummy and
lagged changes in Q, Log(assets), debt to assets, ROA, Log(income), unemployment rate, year and
industry dummies (defined according to the two digits SIC classification). In column 1 the dependent
variable is the change in common dividend between year t+1 and year t scaled by earnings in year t.
In column 2 it is the change in common dividend scaled by total assets. In column 3 it is the change in
dividend per share. In columns 4 and 5 the dependent variable is the change in dividend payout (defined
as common dividend over net income). Column 4 includes only firms with zero dividend payout at time
t ; column 5 includes only firms with positive dividend payout at time t. The sample comprises matched
and treated firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In the year before a UI increase
treated firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total assets and industry. Please
refer to the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. Standard errors, clustered at the state level,
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.











UI 0.814*** 0.228** 6.116* 1.753*** 12.372**
(0.298) (0.106) (3.146) (0.563) (5.787)
Observations 983 782 782 477 305
R-squared 0.079 0.053 0.291 0.033 0.156
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
State Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES




Table A4 reports regressions of changes in leverage (columns 1 and 3) and net leverage (columns 2
and 4 on a UI dummy and lagged changes in Q, ROA, debt to assets, Log(assets), the logarithm of
state income per capita and unemployment rate. Each regression includes year and industry dummies
(defined according to the two digits SIC classification). The sample comprises matched and treated
firms that experience a UI increase between 1991 and 2007. In the year before a UI increase treated
firms are matched by Tobin’s Q, Log(assets), ROA, debt to total assets and industry. Please refer to
the Appendix A.1 for a definition of the variables. The sample of columns 1 and 2 includes only firms
with positive earnings in year t and t+1. In columns 3 and 4 the same matching procedure is adopted,
but requiring each firm to have negative earnings in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the state
level, are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10% 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
Variable:
Leverage Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage
UI -0.005 0.005 0.022* 0.031**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 736 735 582 582
R-squared 0.214 0.111 0.079 0.064
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
State Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firms in Sample Negative Earn. Positive Earn. Negative Earn. Positive Earn.
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